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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 09482

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARA 5)

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 21, 1978
(SALT TWO-1791)

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JUNE 21, 1978

- I

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION WILL ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, WHICH MUST BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ENTIRE SET OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS YOU KNOW, THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT THE SIDES HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL RECORDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE QUESTION OF LIMITING
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CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS.

THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF PARS. 1 AND 2 OF ARTICLE III OF THE PROTOCOL--ON MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS NOT TO FLIGHT-TEST OR DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 2,500 KILOMETERS, AND ALSO NOT TO DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600

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KILOMETERS ON SEA-BASED LAUNCHERS OR LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS.

THERE IS ALSO AGREEMENT ON THE WORDING OF ARTICLE V, PAR. 1, OF THE DRAFT TREATY, ACCORDING TO WHICH HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS, ALONG WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, WILL BE LIMITED WITHIN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1,320.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, AS A RESULT OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES HAVE ALSO COME CLOSER TOGETHER WITH RESPECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, OF THE DRAFT TREATY--ON THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS--AS THEY RELATE TO LIMITATION ON LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES.

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT, IN CONNECTION WITH THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS BEING WORKED OUT FOR THE NEW TREATY WILL APPLY TO ANY CRUISE MISSILE WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE, INCLUDING THOSE SET FORTH IN THE DRAFTING GROUP, AT THE APRIL 14, 1978 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION,
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PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS, TABLED REVISED WORDING FOR THE AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 8, OF THE DRAFT TREATY, ACCORDING TO WHICH THE RANGE OF A CRUISE MISSILE IS THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE WHICH CAN BE COVERED BY THE MISSILE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN MODE FLYING UNTIL FUEL EXHAUSTION, DETERMINED BY PROJECTING ITS FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE EARTH'S SPHERE FROM POINT OF LAUNCH TO POINT OF IMPACT.

THIS PROVISION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING ON CRUISE MISSILE LIMITATION, REACHED AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL, WHICH PROVIDES FOR ESTAB-LISHING LIMITS OF 600 AND 2,500 KILOMETERS; AS ALREADY SAID HERE, THEY ARE RECORDED IN THE RELEVANT AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT TREATY AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, JUST AS THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILES PER SE, MUST BE CONTAINED IN THE TREATY ITSELF, NAMELY IN ITS ARTICLE II WHICH CONTAINS DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, LIMITATIONS ON WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE OBLIGATIONS

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BEING ASSUMED BY THE SIDES. AS WE HAVE SHOWN HERE, THE VERY IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 600 KILOMETERS, BEING AN ORGANIC PART OF THE TREATY, WILL REMAIN IN FORCE FOR THE ENTIRE TERM OF THE TREATY, THAT IS, THROUGH 1985. THEREFORE, THE RELEVANT DEFINITIONS MUST BE IN THE TREATY AND NOT IN THE PROTOCOL THERETO, WHICH HAS A SHORTER TERM, NAMELY THREE YEARS.

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WITH REGARD TO THE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE JUNE 14, 1978 MEETING SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS CONTAINING A NUMBER OF NEW ELEMENTS. THIS IS BEING STUDIED. IN SOME CASES, IT SEEMS, A CLOSENESS OR COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS HAS EMERGED.

NOT HAVING IN MIND AT THIS POINT TO EXPRESS THE SOVIET SIDE'S POSITION ON THE CONSIDERATIONS STATED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE AFOREMENTIONED MEETING, TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFYING THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS.

AS FAR AS ONE CAN JUDGE, WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF THE RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES WHICH, AS WAS MENTIONED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT, ARE DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR ENGAGING TARGETS OTHER THAN

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SHIPS, THE U.S. SIDE NOW APPLIES TWO CONDITIONS--ONE
RELATED TO THE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE OF A CRUISE
MISSILE AND A SECOND RELATED TO THE DISTANCE WHICH CAN
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BE COVERED BY SUCH A MISSILE WHEN OPERATING IN ITS
STANDARD FULL SYSTEM DESIGN MODE. WHAT IS THE CORRELATION
BETWEEN THESE TWO CONDITIONS? SHOULD IT BE UNDERSTOOD
THAT ONLY ONE OF THE AFOREMENTIONED CONDITIONS WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SIDES ARE COMPLYING
WITH THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED ON THE RANGE OF THE
CORRESPONDING CRUISE MISSILES?

IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECOND CONDITION, BASED ON
THE DISTANCE WHICH CAN BE COVERED BY THE MISSILE, IT WAS
NOTED THAT THIS DISTANCE WOULD BE MEASURED ALONG THE
PROJECTION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE'S FLIGHT PATH ONTO THE
EARTH'S SPHERE FROM POINT OF LAUNCH TO POINT OF IMPACT.
HOWEVER, IN THIS CONNECTION, MENTION IS MADE NOT ONLY OF
USING THE GIVEN CRUISE MISSILE IN ITS STANDARD DESIGN
MODE, BUT ALSO OF USING THE "FULL SYSTEM."

WHAT DOES THAT ADDITION MEAN?

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE JUNE 14,
1978 MEETING NOTES THAT THE APPROACH SET FORTH WOULD PLACE
A FINITE LIMIT ON THE MAXIMUM DISTANCE A CRUISE MISSILE
CAN COVER. WHAT SPECIFIC MAXIMUM DISTANCE IS THE U.S.
DELEGATION TALKING ABOUT?
FURTHERMORE, THE U.S. SIDE HAS SAID THAT THE .
PROPOSED DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WOULD NOT
INCLUDE THE ADDITIONAL DISTANCE WHICH THE MISSILE
THEORETICALLY COULD FLY IF IT USED ITS FUEL RESERVE.
WHAT ADDITIONAL DISTANCE COULD THE CRUISE MISSILE FLY BY
USING THIS RESERVE WHEN CARRYING OUT A FLIGHT UNDER, SAY,
AVERAGED CONDITIONS?

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE JUNE 14,
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1978 MEETING PROVIDES FOR DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE
LIMITATION OF THE RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES DEPENDING UPON
THE TARGETS AGAINST WHICH THEY ARE USED. AND YET,
PROVISIONS ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN CRUISE MISSILES BY BASING MODE ONLY AND NOT AT
ALL ON THE BASIS OF THE TARGETS AGAINST WHICH THEY ARE

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USED. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO BEAR THIS IN MIND AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHICH CRUISE MISSILES ARE MEANT, IN TERMS OF THEIR BASING MODE, WHEN YOU SPEAK OF CRUISE MISSILES "DEVELOPED AND TESTED FOR ANTI-SHIP MISSIONS?"

- III

THESE ARE THE QUESTIONS THE USSR DELEGATION WANTED TO ASK AT TODAY'S MEETING FOR PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 14, 1978.

THE USSR DELEGATION RESERVES THE RIGHT TO RAISE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SHOULD THE NEED ARISE. EARLE

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